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Abstract 
 Taking up Hannah Arendt’s analysis of statelessness and her critique of sovereign power, 
this paper argues that the condition of ‘rightlessness’ has become normalized within the 
international order. In contrast to claims that globalization has undermined sovereignty, 
Arendt’s work helps to illuminate how states continue to reinforce their power to exclude 
and contain stateless persons while simultaneously deploying the discourse of universal 
human rights. Current state policies reveal that rightlessness is deeply embedded within the 
logic of the inter-state system. In a globalizing world where states are increasingly called 
upon to conform to universal standards of human rights, millions of stateless persons con-
tinue to be segregated from the public realm of eﬀective political agency by statist practices 
of global apartheid, thereby rendering them ‘superﬂuous’ human beings. 
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 Introduction 
 Th e United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates 
that at the end of 2006 there were 9.9 million refugees, 5.8 million stateless 
persons, 12.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), and 4.4 million 
asylum-seekers and other ‘persons of concern’, producing a total of 32.9 
million displaced persons globally.1 Th ese ﬁgures are conservative, how-
ever, because they include only those persons of concern speciﬁcally receiv-
ing protection and assistance from the UNHCR. Other stateless peoples, 
for instance, include the 4.3 million Palestinian refugees dispersed across 
1)  UNHCR 2007. 
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the Middle East who fall under the mandate of the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency instead of the UNHCR. Th us the actual numbers of 
displaced persons globally are likely to be considerably higher. Recent 
research suggests that there are at least 11 million stateless persons around 
the world.2 While stateless persons can be found not only in the ‘anony-
mous’ ﬂows of refugees and IDPs, as well as in ‘recognizable’ groups such 
as the Roma, Kurds, and Biharis, unlike refugees they do not have legal or 
eﬀective citizenship in relation to any state. Without legal or eﬀective citi-
zenship, stateless persons in essence have no rights. According to the 
UNHCR the deprivation of rights that accompanies statelessness often 
leaves stateless persons “in a Kafkaesque legal vacuum” which reduces them 
to “non-persons, legal ghosts.”3 What the UNHCR does not address, how-
ever, is the underlying structural condition that continually produces 
widespread statelessness. 
 Hannah Arendt lived the perilous and uncertain existence of a stateless 
person for eighteen years, from the time she ﬂed Germany without travel 
documents in 1933 to when she became a naturalized US citizen in 1951.4 
Arendt’s experience led her to reﬂect critically upon both the fate of state-
less persons during the mid-twentieth century and the larger question of 
the relationship between statelessness and the modern nation-state. Th e 
special signiﬁcance of statelessness for Arendt is that it is symptomatic of 
“underlying structures which have today come into the open” through the 
appearance of transnational political catastrophes.5 More speciﬁcally, the 
phenomenon of mass statelessness starkly reveals “what had been hidden 
throughout the history of national sovereignty,”6 namely, the destructive 
contradiction between universal human rights and the sovereign power of 
the modern state. Contemporary history shows that the construction of 
the international system upon the sovereign power to exclude leads to the 
formation of “superﬂuous” human beings “that are put in concentration 
camps by their foes and in internment camps by their friends.”7 
 Th is article explores Arendt’s critique of sovereignty and her account of 
the structural contradiction between sovereign power and universal human 
2)  UNHCR 2007. 
3)  UNHCR 2006. 
4)  Young-Bruehl 2004, pp. 105–107 and 152–159. 
5)  Arendt 1994, p. 74. 
6)  Arendt 2004, p. 354. 
7)  Arendt 2007, p. 265. 
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rights, and suggests that the arguments put forth by Arendt are quite use-
ful in attempting to understand and theorize the continuing legal and 
political exclusion of the stateless. Th e most important aspect of Arendt’s 
critique, I contend, is that it highlights how statelessness is not an aberrant 
or accidental phenomenon occurring despite the best eﬀorts of states to 
prevent it, but a ‘normalized’ systemic condition produced by an interna-
tional order predicated upon the power to exclude as the essence of statist 
politics. Th e political realities of statelessness experienced by Arendt and 
millions of other persons have not disappeared but have become the order 
of the day. Hence, Arendt’s insights should lead us to interrogate the ade-
quacy of recent claims that state power to exclude is being undermined by 
processes of globalization. 
 In the following two sections, I discuss Arendt’s critical analysis of the 
modern conception of human rights and her concomitant critique of state 
sovereignty. For Arendt, the inherent contradiction between rights and 
sovereignty is manifested in the tragedy of statelessness and what she 
referred to as the condition of ‘rightlessness’ experienced by stateless per-
sons. I then deploy her critique of sovereignty in order to call attention to 
the relationship between ‘inclusive exclusion’ and the eﬀorts of powerful 
states to globally integrate a strategy of containment of stateless persons 
and refugees. I ultimately argue that this strategy reinforces a coercive sys-
tem of global apartheid. 
 Th e Sovereign Eclipse of Universal Human Rights 
 Arendt oﬀers a powerful critique of the modern conception of human 
rights which repudiates naturalist metaphysics and liberal subjectivism as 
the bases for human rights, arguing that the failure of such foundations 
was most clearly exempliﬁed by the problem of stateless persons in the 
twentieth century.8 Even more signiﬁcantly, this critique exposes the fact 
that the international order systematically generates statelessness as a con-
sequence of several contradictions at the core of its normative and organi-
zational principles. She observed that the international system has normalized 
the condition of displacement and political exclusion, ensuring that mil-
lions of innocent people are consigned daily to the oblivion of rightless-
ness. Arendt highlights the abject status of those who have ceased to belong 
8)  Arendt 2004, p. 353. 
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to any state thus: “No paradox of contemporary politics is ﬁlled with more 
poignant irony than the discrepancy between the eﬀorts of well-meaning 
idealists who stubbornly insist on regarding as ‘inalienable’ those human 
rights, which are enjoyed only by citizens of the most prosperous and civi-
lized countries, and the situation of the rightless themselves.”9 
 Despite positing the autonomous sovereign subject as the foundation of 
universal rights, human rights were in fact ﬁrst realized only in the particu-
lar contexts of the two national struggles of the American and French revo-
lutions. Th e contradiction here is that the sovereignty of each autonomous 
individual had to be reconciled with that of all others in forming the body 
politic.10 What this meant was an essential devaluation of the importance 
of the supposedly inalienable rights of the individual vis-à-vis the national 
will and the collective right to self-determination. It follows that the rights 
set forth as resting solely upon the human being’s natural life in reality 
presupposed not only the existence of a polity but also the sovereignty of 
the general will of the people. As Arendt eﬀectively shows, this awkward 
coupling of individual sovereignty as the expression of subjective inalien-
able rights, and national sovereignty as the expression of the collective 
rights of the people to self-government underwrites the emergence of the 
modern nation-state. Th is implies that “man had hardly appeared as a 
completely emancipated, completely isolated being who carried his dignity 
within himself without reference to some larger encompassing order, when 
he disappeared again into a member of a people.”11 Th e idealization of 
human rights based upon the metaphysical notion of a sovereign subject 
elevated the abstract individual above the nation-state, while simultane-
ously the aﬃrmation of national sovereignty idealized as the “nebulous 
representative of a ‘national soul’ ” meant that “human rights were pro-
tected and enforced only as national rights.”12 
 Th e contradiction between human rights and national sovereignty had 
further implications for the legitimacy of the state. Th e ascendancy of 
nationalism transformed the state from an entity whose “supreme func-
tion” was protection of the human rights of “all inhabitants in its territory 
no matter what their nationality,” into one whose function was to distin-
guish between nationals and non-nationals and on this basis to “grant full 
 9)  Arendt 2004, p. 355. 
10)  Arendt 2004, pp. 77–79. 
11)  Arendt 2004, p. 369. 
12)  Arendt 2004, p. 297. 
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civil and political rights only to those who belonged to the national com-
munity by right of origin and fact of birth.”13 Th e state, in other words, 
was transformed from an impartial instrument of the law committed to 
the equal protection of each individual’s rights, into an ideological instru-
ment of the “pseudomystical” nation whose “will” and interests were com-
mitted to protecting only the members of this nation.14 With the ascendancy 
of nationalist sentiment over the rule of law – what Arendt refers to as 
the “conquest of the state by the nation” – the abstract “national interest” 
became prioritized over the interests of singular and concrete human 
beings.15 From this point the “tragedy of the nation-state,” and by exten-
sion of the international system of states, was embodied in the fact that the 
legal protection of rights extended only to those persons recognized as 
“nationals.”16 All non-nationals within a given territory were immediately 
subject to the potential for exclusion from the polity and its guarantee of 
equal rights. Th e ‘decline’ of the state thus signiﬁes that its legal institu-
tions no longer functioned equally for all its inhabitants, leaving non-
nationals not simply on the margins of society but outside the law itself as 
‘threats’ to the national interest. 
 Th e association of human rights with nationality meant in practice that 
these rights existed solely within domestic law and belonged only to recog-
nized citizens of particular nation-states. Th e identiﬁcation of citizenship 
with nationality rather than humanity became the precondition for the 
eﬀective possession of human rights and coincided with the emphasis on 
mutually exclusive citizenries within the nation-state system. Th us, human 
rights were strictly delimited to the domain of a speciﬁc state and placed 
under the protection of a single government. Th is situation divested the 
Rights of Man of their supposedly universal and inalienable character, 
exposing them as entirely contingent and social. In the new statist era only 
membership within a particular nation-state could guarantee rights their 
legal status. However, those persons excluded from having a recognized 
place within a polity were compelled to live either as “exceptions” to the 
general equality assured to citizens (deﬁned as nationals) or, what became 
increasingly the norm, “under conditions of absolute lawlessness.”17 Th e 
13)  Arendt 2004, p. 296. 
14)  Arendt 2004, p. 297. 
15)  Arendt 2004, p. 296. 
16)  Arendt 2004, p. 379. 
17)  Arendt 2004, p. 343. 
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paradoxical implication of this identiﬁcation between human rights and 
nationality is that expulsion from a state results in the loss of legal and 
political status and therefore all human rights. “Th e Rights of Man,” Arendt 
underscores, “had been deﬁned as ‘inalienable’ because they were supposed 
to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment 
human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon 
their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no insti-
tution was willing to guarantee them.”18 
 Arendt’s critical analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of the mod-
ern conception of rights thus identiﬁes two fundamental contradictions at 
the heart of this doctrine. Th e ﬁrst is that the interests of the pre-political 
sovereign subject as the bearer of individual rights conﬂict with the inter-
ests of the political sovereign state as the bearer of collective rights. Th e 
second is that as citizenship entitlements within the context of a particular 
state human rights are conditional and exclusive, premised upon national-
ity rather than humanity. Th is critique not only exposes the conﬂict between 
universalist ideals and particularist realities that erode the integrity of the 
conventional formulation of human rights, but more importantly it makes 
clear that within an international system predicated upon the supremacy 
of national sovereignty, human rights cannot be enforced outside the state. 
Arendt draws two further insights from her analysis: ﬁrst, states have been 
empowered historically with the sovereign right to determine who is enti-
tled to nationality and thus to possession of human rights, and second, 
that any person not accorded full citizenship status is excluded, to some 
degree, from human rights. Th e central paradox of the notion of inaliena-
ble human rights is that while the protection of human rights within the 
international system is inseparably tied to state sovereignty, states are also 
authorized to deprive citizens of those same rights and to exclude individu-
als from the condition of nationality that would enable them to have 
human rights. By controlling admission into or expulsion from nationality 
or citizenship, states thereby control each individual’s prospects for the 
eﬀective possession and exercise of human rights.19  
18)  Arendt 2004, p. 370. 
19)  Following customary practice of international law, the terms ‘citizenship’ and ‘national-
ity’ will be used synonymously. 
6
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol3/iss2/3
DOI: 101163/187219108X300046
254 P. Hayden / Societies Without Borders 3 (2008) 248–269
 Statelessness, Rightlessness, and the Power to Exclude 
 Th e full implications of the sovereign power to exclude persons from polit-
ical community became apparent when European governments began to 
denationalize large segments of their populations in the wake of World 
War I, leading to the creation of entire groups of people for whom “there 
was no country on earth in which they enjoyed the right to residence.”20 
Arendt cites several examples of “mass denationalizations” during this period, 
such as the Belgian laws of 1922 and 1934 that “canceled naturalization of 
persons who had committed antinational acts during the war,” the Italian 
(1926), Egyptian (1926), French (1927), and Turkish (1928) laws that 
allowed for the denaturalization of persons “who were a threat to the social 
order” or “who committed acts contrary to the interests” of the state, and 
the Austrian and German laws of 1933 that allowed the state to denation-
alize any citizen living abroad.21 Although denationalization became a 
favoured weapon of totalitarian states, this particular prerogative of “full 
sovereign power” in principle can be wielded by any type of state; further, 
the mass denationalizations of the 1920s and 1930s established an “easy 
precedent” for the postwar period.22 Indeed, at the time of writing Th e 
Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt was deeply disturbed by proposals in the 
United States to strip US-born nationals who were communists (or sus-
pected of being so) of their citizenship. What made these measures so “sin-
ister” is that they could be proposed “in all innocence,” as expressions of 
the sacrosanct sovereign right to protect national interests.23 
 Th e forced deportations of unwanted minority groups and the mass 
denationalizations of “undesirable” populations led to the emergence of 
the apatride as a ﬁgure symptomatic of “a world organized into nation-
states”: the stateless person lacking governmental representation and pro-
tection and thus forced to live outside the pale of the law.24 Th e explosion 
in stateless and refugee numbers in the mid-twentieth century quickly 
exposed the structural deﬁciencies of the international system, in particu-
lar the “inability of European nation-states to guarantee human rights to 
those who had lost nationally guaranteed rights.”25 From this point on 
20)  Arendt 2004, p. 352. 
21)  Arendt 2004, p. 355. 
22)  Arendt 2004, p. 354 and p. 353. 
23)  Arendt 2004, p. 356. 
24)  Arendt 2004, p. 354. 
25)  Arendt 2004, p. 343. 
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mass statelessness, which was and continues to be treated discursively and 
practically as an exceptional or temporary problem, in fact became a per-
manent phenomenon constituted by the sovereign rights of expulsion and 
denationalization. Th is had several further negative eﬀects upon the nation-
state system and the doctrine of human rights. First, the right of asylum, 
associated with the longstanding practice of providing refuge, protection 
and sanctuary to exiles and the persecuted since ancient times, collapsed 
because it was considered anachronistic and “in conﬂict with the interna-
tional rights of the state.”26 
 Second, the two ‘remedies’ of repatriation and naturalization were 
ineﬃcacious in the face of statelessness as a mass phenomenon. Naturaliza-
tion was both restrictively oﬀered to small numbers of individuals and 
persistently susceptible to revocation by states, while repatriation proved 
equally problematic in that neither the country of origin (which typically 
caused the problem to begin with by expelling the person who thereby 
became stateless) nor any other state would accept stateless persons.27 In 
essence, stateless persons were consigned to zones of lawlessness subsisting 
within and between the juridical territories of sovereign states. Th is situa-
tion led to the creation of novel sites designed speciﬁcally to accommodate 
the increasing numbers of stateless persons and refugees globally: the intern-
ment camp. Th e internment camp, writes Arendt, “has become the routine 
solution for the problem of domicile” and “the only practical substitute for 
a nonexistent homeland” which the world has “to oﬀer the stateless.”28 
 It is important to note that Arendt’s analysis of statelessness goes beyond 
the narrow juridical deﬁnition that distinguishes between the stateless per-
son and the refugee. Instead, Arendt insists on the need to recognize both the 
de jure stateless, or “a person who is not considered as a national by any State 
under the operation of its law,”29 and the de facto stateless, such as refugees, 
internally displaced persons, resident aliens and immigrants threatened by 
denationalization, ineﬀective nationality, or who are unable to prove either 
their nationality or that they are legally stateless.30 Arendt stresses the qualita-
tive condition of statelessness as extending beyond the merely factual depriva-
tion of national legal status and as occurring irrespective of territorial 
26)  Arendt 2004, p. 357. 
27)  Arendt 2004, pp. 357–361. 
28)  Arendt 2004, p. 355 and p. 361. 
29)  1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, article 1. 
30)  Arendt 2004, p. 356; see Batchelor 1995, pp. 91–92. 
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boundaries. Indeed, the stateless are distinguished precisely by the fact that 
they have “been ejected from the old trinity of state-people-territory.”31 For 
this reason, Arendt claims that “the core of statelessness” – namely, the dep-
rivation of one’s legal status and thus loss of the ability to exercise rights 
eﬀectively within a political community – is “identical with the refugee ques-
tion” insofar as refugees are, for all practical purposes, unable to enjoy the 
rights and protections aﬀorded by citizenship.32 
 It is at this point that the philosophical and political dimensions of 
Arendt’s critique of the traditional doctrine of human rights converge, and 
provides the basis for her claim that the only fundamental human right is 
the right to have rights. For Arendt, it is clear that the loss of membership 
in a political community – the loss of nationality or citizenship – is equiv-
alent to the loss of all human rights and dignity: it is the condition of 
complete rightlessness suﬀered by the abstract human being.33 Th is is because 
nationality has become the deﬁning qualiﬁcation for the individual exer-
cise and the state protection of rights under international law. To be “merely 
human” means that a person is excluded not simply from any particular 
state but from all states; such persons “no longer belong to any community 
whatsoever” and therefore are thrust “out of legality altogether.”34 It is for 
this reason that Arendt insists that the most basic right of each individual, 
prior to any of the speciﬁc human rights proclaimed in various declara-
tions, is the right to have rights, that is, the right to be legally and politi-
cally included in a community that guarantees the equal status of all persons 
residing there, citizens and non-citizens alike, regardless of nationality.35 
 Deprived of their rights, the stateless are “forced to live outside the com-
mon world” and thus are “thrown back . . . on their natural givenness.”36 
Th is condition reduces the stateless to the status of physical object and is a 
sign of the loss of human dignity. Speciﬁcally, to suﬀer a total deprivation 
of rights means losing the political agency and legal recognition by which 
one rises above the “the abstract nakedness of being human and nothing 
but human” to become a person (persona), an agent in the public realm 
where one’s actions are acknowledged and valued by others.37 It is because 
31)  Arendt 2004, p. 358. 
32)  Arendt 2004, p. 357. 
33)  See Isaac 1998. 
34)  Arendt 2004, p. 375 and p. 373. 
35)  Arendt 2004, p. 377. 
36)  Arendt 2004, p. 383. 
37)  Arendt 2004, p. 377. 
9
Hayden: From Exclusion to Containment: Arendt, Sovereign Power, and State
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2009
 P. Hayden / Societies Without Borders 3 (2008) 248–269 257
the stateless are isolated and expelled from political communities that they 
are no longer able to claim human rights. Th e further point to take from 
Arendt’s analysis of human rights is that while the loss of one’s place in the 
world is what activates rightlessness, what makes rightlessness such an 
acute political harm is the virtual “impossibility of ﬁnding a new one.”38 
Th ose persons who remain unclaimed by any community can then be con-
sidered “perfectly superﬂuous,” their lives constantly endangered by the 
power of states to eﬀectuate the condition of rightlessness.39 
 Because we “have really started to live in One World,”40 in which there 
is seemingly no escape from the globalized system of sovereign states, the 
continued insistence that state sovereignty entails an unimpeachable right 
of exclusion is a sure recipe for mass human tragedy. Stateless persons are 
not simply found “outside” society but instead are a by-product of the 
society of states, an “inevitable residue” of the nation-state system which 
relentlessly produces superﬂuous human beings.41  
 Exclusion and Containment: A Dual Strategy 
 Eﬀorts have been made to address the problems identiﬁed by Arendt, but 
because these eﬀorts remain conﬁgured by the imperatives of sovereign 
power success in this direction has been limited at best.42 Th e inability of 
the human rights regime to ‘solve’ the burgeoning problem of stateless per-
sons underscores Arendt’s point that statelessness is not fundamentally a 
problem of geographical space but of political space.43 Th e obvious remedial 
38)  Arendt 2004, p. 372. 
39)  Arendt 2004, p. 375. 
40)  Arendt 2004, p. 377. 
41)  Arendt 2004, p. 247. 
42)  While the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, asserts that 
everyone has a right to nationality (Article 15 and a right to seek asylum in other countries 
(Article 14), these rights are formulated in such a way as to reinforce the notion that nation-
ality is a prerequisite to holding human rights and thus that those without eﬀective or legal 
nationality are necessarily rightless. Further, Article 1 of the 1954 Convention Relating to 
the Status if Stateless Persons provides only a legal deﬁnition of a stateless person as “a 
person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law.” 
Th us the Convention’s deﬁnition deﬁnes only the condition of de jure statelessness, appar-
ently because the drafters of the Convention mistakenly believed that all de facto stateless 
persons were refugees (see Batchelor 1995, p. 92). 
43)  Nyers 2006, p. 17; see also Benhabib 2002. 
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solution to statelessness is for states to grant nationality to all stateless per-
sons, yet the power to grant nationality remains a sovereign prerogative 
immune to human rights ideals. 
 Here the demarcations between who is and who is not included within 
the public space of a community are not territorial per se, but rather ideo-
logically, racially, economically, and politically determined. Consequently 
the phenomenon of statelessness is hardly accidental or aberrant. Th ere are 
many ways in which forced displacement, dislocation, immigration, and 
other varieties of global border-crossing intersect, and numerous historical 
trends in how stateless persons, asylum-seekers, and immigrants have been 
treated. A comprehensive analysis of these trends and modalities is beyond 
the aim of this paper. What I want to highlight instead is a single recent 
trend in the treatment of stateless persons and refugees that arguably sig-
nals the ascension rather than decline of the sovereign power of exclusion 
exposed by Arendt. Th is trend is, in the words of Jacob Stevens, a global 
“strategy of containment.”44 
 Th e strategy of containment has been devised and enforced through 
numerous national and international mechanisms since the 1970s, when 
Western states began to conceive of the work of the UNHCR above all in 
terms of “intervention in crisis zones of the Th ird World” rather than “reset-
tlement” of European refugees. Th ese “new” refugees were regarded as “prob-
lem people,” a collective source of anxiety and potential instability due to 
their “irregularity.”45 Th e response has consisted not only of tightening bor-
der controls and immigration policies but of rationalizing the function of the 
UNHCR and other refugee organizations as ‘emergency’ or crisis relief. 
 Th us rather than focusing on granting asylum to refugees and stateless 
persons, and integrating them legally into communities that will enable 
them to assert their rights, the new strategic turn is towards containment 
and mass repatriation without the restoration of rights. Th is approach is 
achieved primarily by means of vast networks of internment camps, ‘safe 
havens,’ emergency centres, holding stations, and detention facilities.46 
In these spaces of what Arendt termed ‘superﬂuousness,’ undesirables 
who have been deemed to belong nowhere are condemned to inclusive 
exclusion.47 Dispossessed of their human rights and political agency, the 
44)  Stevens 2006, p. 65. 
45)  Marﬂeet 2006, pp. 150–151. 
46)  Stevens 2006, pp. 65–67; Marﬂeet 2006, p. 151. 
47)  See Agamben 1998, pp. 28–29. 
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stateless are simultaneously integrated within the decision-making author-
ity of sovereign power and segregated from the normalized territory of poten-
tial host states. 
 Th ese spaces of superﬂuousness are extraterritorial in that they may be 
situated either within or without the territorial borders of a sovereign state, 
yet in either case they are exempted from the jurisdiction of the ‘normal’ 
order of law. Perhaps the most well-known recent example of such a space 
is the camp at Guantánamo Bay established by the US government as a 
centrepiece of its ‘War on Terror.’ Yet more far-reaching examples of the 
strategy of containment abound. Th e Australian government’s two-track 
policy of preventive interception and detention is notable here. Th is policy 
was crafted in the aftermath of the Tampa ‘crisis’, in which more than 400 
Afghan refugees in a sinking ﬁshing boat were rescued by a Norwegian 
cargo ship that then attempted to oﬄoad them at Christmas Island. After 
the Tampa was denied permission to enter Australia’s territorial waters, Spe-
cial Forces boarded the ship and the refugees were transported by warship 
to the island of Nauru, where the Australian government has established an 
oﬀshore detention centre in which to hold and process asylum-seekers away 
from the territory of the Australian state.48 
 Following this incident the Australian government formally inaugurated 
the so-called ‘Paciﬁc Solution.’ Th is policy is designed to intercept and 
prevent boats carrying asylum-seekers from entering Australian territorial 
waters, and divert asylum-seekers to detention camps established on sev-
eral South Paciﬁc island nations.49 One of the ﬁrst components of this new 
policy was passage of the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migra-
tion Zone) Act.50 Th is act excised a number of external territories (includ-
ing Christmas Island) from Australia’s migration zone, which means that 
asylum-seekers (‘unauthorized arrivals’) arriving in these territories now 
have no right to apply for a visa, have no recourse to Australian courts, 
and may be transported to oﬀshore detention facilities. A cornerstone of 
the ‘Paciﬁc Solution’ is the policy of mandatory detention. According to 
this policy all ‘unauthorized arrivals’ on Australian territory are compulso-
rily imprisoned within one of the detention facilities established through-
out Australia and the Paciﬁc islands. Asylum-seekers may be detained 
indeﬁnitely, the facilities are exempted from judicial review and children, 
48)  Howard 2003. 
49)  Oxfam Australia 2002. 
50)  Available online at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/bd/2001–02/02bd069.htm. 
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including infants, are detained though often separated from close family 
members. 
 Th e Australian government also introduced a new type of visa, the ‘Tem-
porary Protection Visa’ (TPV), to replace the Permanent Protection Visa 
(PPV) previously given to asylum-seekers, on the grounds that the PPVs 
“were far more generous than required by Australia’s international obliga-
tions.” TPVs allow visa holders to remain in Australia for up to three years; 
during this period they may be deported at any time by the Australian 
government and when the visa expires they must reapply for a further 
TPV, which again provides the government with the opportunity to revoke 
their refugee status and deport them if they “are no longer in need of Aus-
tralia’s protection.” In August 2003, the TPV policy was made retroactive 
to supersede all PPVs granted prior to that date.51 ‘Temporary protection’ 
is now the only status granted to all refugees in Australia, including those 
who have already been through a full asylum determination in light of the 
1951 Refugee Convention.52 
 Several recent decisions by the High Court of Australia further strengthen 
the sovereign power of containment and exclusion. In Behrooz v Secretary, 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Aﬀairs (August 
2004), the High Court held that the conditions of immigration detention 
are irrelevant to the question of whether the detention is lawful, and thus 
that even inhumane conditions of detention cannot excuse escape from 
administrative detention centres. In Al-Kateb v Godwin (August 2004), the 
High Court supported the government’s argument that the 1958 Migra-
tion Act authorizes indeﬁnite detention of unlawful non-citizens (‘aliens’), 
including those whose asylum application had failed. In other words a 
stateless person can be held in immigration detention indeﬁnitely, includ-
ing for life, even if he or she wishes to leave Australia.53 Finally, in Re Wool-
ley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 (October 2004), the High Court held 
that the Al-Kateb decision applies to all aliens, whether adults or children, 
51)  Australian Government 2007. 
52)  Human Rights Watch 2006. 
53)  Th is is what happened to Peter Qasim, who was born in the disputed territory of Kash-
mir, India but ﬂed to Australia as an asylum seeker in 1998 because of fears of political 
persecution. Qasim arrived in Australia without identity documents and India refused to 
acknowledge that he was an Indian citizen. As an ‘illegal’ stateless person, Qasim was placed 
in mandatory detention where he remained for seven years. In July 2005 he was released 
and given a ‘Return Pending Bridging Visa’ which allowed him to remain in Australia tem-
porarily until he could be deported to another country. See BBC News 2005. 
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therefore “there is no constitutional limitation on the immigration deten-
tion of children.”54 According to then Prime Minister John Howard such 
sovereign authority is justiﬁed inasmuch as “It is in the national interest 
that we have the power . . . to prevent, beyond any argument, people infring-
ing on the sovereignty of this country.”55 
 A similar system of containment and exclusion has been assembled across 
Europe and the UK. With regard to ‘irregular’ migration the European 
Union has increasingly focused on extraterritorial policing, incarceration, 
and deportation of asylum-seekers, and hundreds of detention centres have 
been established in EU states.56 Th e resulting system of containment and 
exclusion has been referred to as ‘Fortress Europe.’57 In 2003 for instance, 
the United Kingdom proposed “a radically new approach to delivering the 
reduction of asylum seeker numbers” based on two types of “zones of pro-
tection”: “regional protection zones” located outside Europe which would 
address asylum claims arising from regional conﬂicts or natural disasters, 
and “transit processing centres” located along the borders of the European 
Union which would process asylum claims without asylum-seekers traveling 
to the countries in which they want to seek asylum.58 As with Australia’s 
‘Paciﬁc Solution,’ this proposal has a dual eﬀect: ﬁrst, it incapacitates the 
ability of asylum-seekers to apply for refugee status since EU states are obli-
gated to investigate asylum claims only when an application is lodged on 
the territory of a member state; second, it creates a mechanism for lowering 
the standards for repatriation and facilitates mass deportation by maintain-
ing ‘transit’ camps outside European borders. According to one report, what 
is most disturbing about the recent EU asylum directives is their “abandon-
ment of the principle of non-refoulement” and their “declared and expressed 
intention to return people from EU states without examining their claim 
to asylum.”59
Contrary to the stated aim of ‘protection’ zones, the increased militariza-
tion of European border control has increased the desperation, vulnerabil-
ity, and degradation of refugees.60 As Matthew Gibney explains, “While 
54)  Australian Government 2004. 
55)  Kelly 2001, emphasis added. 
56)  Marﬂeet 2006, p. 4 and p. 55. 
57)  See Geddes 2000 and Milborn 2007. 
58)  “Home Secretary Statement on Zones of Protection” (27 March 2003), available online 
at http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/Press%20statements/home_secretary_statement_on_zone.htm. 
59)  Schuster 2005, p. 38. 
60)  Human Rights Watch (2007), for example, reports that more than 900 unaccompanied 
children from Africa arrived in the Canary Islands by boat in 2006. In response the Spanish 
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variations remain across countries, in the last decade those seeking refuge 
have increasingly faced the prospect of detention, denial of the right to 
work, limitations or exclusions from welfare beneﬁts, diminishing rights to 
appeal negative decisions, and, ultimately, deportation.” For that reason, 
Gibney adds, “woe betide those who arrive in Western states claiming to 
be a refugee.”61 Recent policies and practices towards the displaced strategi-
cally (re)deﬁne refugees and stateless persons solely through an exclusion-
ary process which places them outside the community of ‘privileged’ 
rights-holders yet within the realm of sovereign power, constituting them 
as superﬂuous human beings in a state of permanent limbo – despite the 
fact that each of the countries mentioned above are signatories to all the 
major international human rights treaties proclaiming the ‘inherent dignity’ 
and ‘inalienable rights’ of all persons. Th e strategy of inclusive exclusion 
serves ultimately to buttress states’ denial of responsibility to those outside 
their borders. 
 Inclusive Exclusion as Global Apartheid 
 Th is strategy may also be viewed as an attempt to exploit racist and xeno-
phobic tendencies in order to shape perceptions about stateless persons 
as undesirable ‘others’ seeking to squander the resources of the state and 
exploit the good will of the nation, thereby corrupting the health and wel-
fare of the nation-state. In this way the asylum process serves predomi-
nantly a police rather than a humanitarian function. Th is position further 
enhances the notion that state borders are a ‘natural’ boundary separating 
an essentialist and pregiven ‘us’ from ‘them,’ whereby sovereignty is pre-
mised upon the classiﬁcation, regulation, restriction and exclusion of 
asylum-seekers as threatening ‘interlopers’ and ‘problems.’ But the para-
doxical manner of this exclusion, as Arendt recognized, entails insertion 
within the interior of sovereign power. 
 From this perspective the nexus of sovereign power and statelessness 
can be aptly characterized as a virulent system of global apartheid which 
government opened four new ‘emergency centres,’ in which the majority of the children are 
being detained for indeﬁnite periods and, according to HRW observers, are regularly sub-
jected to abuse and ill-treatment by staﬀ. Th e children have also been denied the opportu-
nity to apply for asylum, as required by the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(ratiﬁed by Spain in 1990). 
61)  Gibney 2006, p. 141. 
15
Hayden: From Exclusion to Containment: Arendt, Sovereign Power, and State
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2009
 P. Hayden / Societies Without Borders 3 (2008) 248–269 263
establishes a permanent underclass of superﬂuous human beings. One of 
the core functions of sovereign power – the creation and coercive enforce-
ment of national identity boundaries – now takes place within a global 
context where frontiers are dynamically ‘managed’ in extraterritorial spaces 
and through deterritorialized forms of rule. Even as the nation-state has 
been reconﬁgured in the global age it nevertheless operates so as to draw 
new lines of demarcation for maintaining segregation between ‘insiders’ 
and alien ‘outsiders,’ thereby perpetuating inequality of rights and social, 
economic, and political status. According to Anthony Richmond, the cur-
rent treatment of stateless persons, refugees, and immigrants predomi-
nantly from poorer countries closely resembles the apartheid system of 
South Africa because it systemically discriminates on the basis of birth-
place, race, or ethnicity; diﬀerentially assigns rights (or denies them alto-
gether) according to the naturalization of identity; employs state authority 
to militarize borders; forcibly expels people to zones and camps (‘home-
lands’) of containment and detention; and justiﬁes coercive exclusion of 
‘others’ in the name of security for a relatively homogeneous population.62 
 Étienne Balibar similarly argues that global apartheid has arrived with 
the transformation of the international system into a global order which 
nevertheless retains the nation-state as its core political and administrative 
unit. Following Arendt’s lead, Balibar diagnoses the paradoxes that arise as 
state power becomes increasingly relayed through global networks. Most 
fundamentally he suggests, “At the moment at which humankind becomes 
economically and, to some extent, culturally ‘united,’ it is violently divided 
‘biopolitically’.”63 For Balibar, even the recent processes of European 
uniﬁcation reveal contradictions between the universalist ideal of human 
rights and the practice of (European) citizenship as both a model of cos-
mopolitan inclusion and a mechanism of exclusion applied to immigrants, 
refugees, and stateless persons. Th e main problem is that inclusion remains 
structurally tied to national identity. On the one hand, the birth of the 
European Union brought with it the new category of ‘European citizens’ 
and the promise of the transnationalization of rights. On the other hand, 
while the 1991 Maastricht Treaty introduced the legal notion of a com-
mon European citizenship, according to the terms of the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam this citizenship is reserved only to those persons who already 
possess the nationality of a member state. In this way the EU has further 
62)  Richmond 1994, esp. pp. 206–217. 
63)  Balibar 2004, p. 130. 
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entrenched the diﬀerentiation of the entire population of Europe into citi-
zens, or the ‘European people’ proper, and aliens, a class which paradoxi-
cally includes “the immigrant population permanently residing in Europe.”64 
In basing the possession of European citizenship rights upon prior national 
belonging – while institutionally retaining each state’s right to determine 
its sovereign control of nationality criteria at the same time as ‘harmoniz-
ing’ Europe-wide refugee and asylum policies – the EU has constructed a 
new form of identity and citizenship that preserves rather than overcomes 
its colonial past. 
 Parallel to the historical example of apartheid, contemporary Europe 
includes within its borders tens of thousands of “insiders oﬃcially consid-
ered outsiders,” viewed biopolitically as a minority population whose fam-
ily compositions, ways of life and so forth must be controlled (or moulded) 
to protect the ‘quality’ of the existing dominant national community. Th e 
intersection of immigration policy with family politics in conjunction with 
the creation of European citizenship illustrates the contradictory and evo-
lutionary pattern of “European citizenship-cum-apartheid” as a global-local 
problem.65 For Balibar this institutionalized segregation of the European 
population not only establishes a permanent underclass in European states 
and cities but more broadly symbolizes how the globalized world is steadily 
divided into “life zones and death zones” within cities, states, and regions 
across the globe.66 Whether in Europe or elsewhere in the globalized world, 
whole classes of people – including refugees, asylum-seekers, and migrant 
workers – become de facto if not de jure stateless persons as the mutating 
borders of exclusion continually deprive individuals and communities of 
the ability to eﬀectively exercise their civil, political, social, and economic 
rights. Th e destructive tendency of global apartheid to segregate certain 
groups of people into “death zones” where human rights have been with-
drawn is, Balibar contends, a process which reproduces “populations that 
are not likely to be productively used or exploited but are always already 
superﬂuous, and therefore can be only eliminated either through ‘political’ 
or ‘natural’ means.”67 As a superﬂuous population, stateless persons are 
“neither assimilated and integrated nor immediately eliminated” but forced 
64)  Balibar 2004, p. 122. 
65)  Balibar 2004, p. 124. 
66)  Balibar 2004, p. 126. 
67)  Balibar 2004, p. 128. 
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to remain in institutionalized “limbo” spaces which serve as the prepara-
tory conditions of possibility for their eventual elimination.68 
 Th e containment, detention, and segregation of stateless persons and 
refugees as practices of global apartheid calls for recognition of a political 
principle contained in Arendt’s work which is necessarily correlative to the 
right to have rights: freedom of movement. What is most at stake politi-
cally for Arendt with regard to statelessness is that the deprivation of rights 
which accompanies this condition amounts to the destruction of the agency 
and dignity of the human person. To be made stateless is to be denied the 
capacity to act and speak in a polity where others regard one as an equal, 
and where one’s actions and speech can assume a meaningful political pres-
ence. One can be the bearer of human rights only when one belongs to, 
and is claimed by a political community which recognizes one’s reciprocal 
claim upon it. Inasmuch as the stateless are deprived of a political way of 
life they are deprived “not of the right to freedom, but of the right to 
action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to 
opinion.”69 Th is emphasis on agency points towards what I suggest is a vital 
inner connection between the right to have rights and freedom of move-
ment. According to Arendt freedom of movement is “historically the old-
est and also the most elementary” of all human liberties.70 In the ﬁrst 
instance this is because being able “to depart for where we will is the pro-
totypical gesture of being free,” just as “limitation of freedom of movement 
has from time immemorial been the precondition for enslavement.”71 But 
there is a further sense in which freedom of movement is essential to the 
right to have rights. Arendt stresses that freedom of movement “is also the 
indispensable condition for action.” Further, because “both action and 
thought occur in the form of movement,” it is clear that freedom of move-
ment “underlies both.”72 
 Hence, as “the indispensable condition for action,” the right to have 
rights cannot be said to be properly guaranteed and exercised without a 
corresponding guarantee of freedom of movement. It is for this reason that 
restrictions on freedom of movement serve as one of the unmistakable 
mechanisms for the production of rightlessness, most egregiously in the 
68)  Balibar 2005, pp. 31–34. 
69)  Arendt 2004, p. 376. 
70)  Arendt 1968, p. 9. 
71)  Arendt 1968, p. 9. 
72)  Arendt 1968, p. 9. 
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case of stateless persons. Similarly, forced displacement, refoulement, rendi-
tion, and any repatriation that is not legitimately voluntary – that is, made 
under conditions where the person “making that choice is currently in pos-
session of his or her civil rights”73 – perpetuate the condition of rightless-
ness through deprivation of the freedom of movement. All of this can be 
viewed in light of Arendt’s critique of sovereignty. For Arendt, sovereignty 
represents a mistaken conception of freedom precisely because sovereignty 
seeks to ﬁx and delimit movement as the form of contingency and sponta-
neity characteristic of action and speech. Yet action, she says, “always estab-
lishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open 
all limitations and cut across all boundaries.”74 Conceived as “uncompro-
mising self-suﬃciency and mastership,”75 sovereignty responds to the con-
tingency of political action by asserting the absolute dominance of the 
sovereign will over the realm of human aﬀairs and thus over the freedom 
of movement of the plurality of individuals and groups inhabiting the 
earth. Consequently, sovereign power requires a condition of inequality for 
its very functioning: it must place limits upon freedom of movement and 
resort to mechanisms of exclusion if it is to assert its supremacy over people 
and territory. Th e sovereignty of the modern nation-state is thus placed on 
a politically disastrous collision course with freedom of movement and the 
right to have rights. Th is way of framing the sovereign power to exclude 
and contain enables us to understand statelessness as nothing less than the 
categorical unwillingness to share the world with others.76  
 Conclusion 
 Th e importance of Arendt for social and political thinking today is in con-
tinuing the critique of the contradictory reliance upon the categories of 
inherent, inalienable, or natural rights within a global system of sovereign 
states. Th e right to have rights is the right to membership in a political 
community, and its meaning and value can only derive from each person 
actually experiencing the political form of life proper to human beings. By 
thinking of human rights in metaphysical terms – as something we possess 
independently of membership in a political community – we fail to fully 
73)  Stevens 2006, p. 67. 
74)  Arendt 1958, p. 190. 
75)  Arendt 1958, p. 234. 
76)  Arendt 1968, p. 25. 
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grasp the crisis of human rights exempliﬁed by stateless persons, a crisis 
that has grown more rather than less acute since the time of Arendt’s inter-
vention. 
 Arendt’s attempt to come to grips with the degradation that results from 
this abject loss of one’s place in the common world provoked her critique 
of sovereignty as the ultimate arbiter and delimiter of movement. I have 
sought to show that the exclusionary logic of the globalized sovereign state 
continues to deﬁne in advance the existence of a class of human beings 
who do not belong, because they lack the illusive national, racial, ethnic, 
or religious identity that supposedly undergirds it. Such people are vio-
lently thrown back upon their ‘merely human’ status. What the conven-
tional approach to the problem of stateless persons misses, then, is the 
perverse symbiosis that exists between sovereignty and statelessness: state-
lessness is only insofar as the sovereign power of exclusion overdetermines 
the world we share with a plurality of others. Arendt’s account of rightless-
ness complicates the usual story. Statelessness is not simply a superstruc-
tural humanitarian problem but a recurring form of global apartheid 
constituted by the state and sovereign power. 
 Arendt’s analysis of human rights, sovereignty, and statelessness relocates 
the focus of attention back to the political and the necessity of member-
ship. Every stateless person is a rightless nonmember as the result of a 
state’s action, or inaction as the case may be. When a state is faced with a 
stateless person, when it encounters his or her human aspiration to exercise 
freedom of movement, it is faced with a clear political choice: to include or 
to exclude this person. Insofar as the decision is exclusion, then a state is 
complicit in the perpetuation of rightlessness and the misery of those who 
are made into the type of superﬂuous human beings put into internment 
camps by their ‘friends.’ In ceasing to belong to any rights-guaranteeing 
community whatsoever, the stateless person stands in stark contrast to the 
citizen included in the public sphere. Whereas the latter become fully 
human in a common world shared with others, the former are alienated 
from this world and lose their relevance to others; they are, paradoxically, 
stripped of something fundamental to their human dignity exactly when 
they are “nothing but human beings.”77 As scholars and human beings, we 
must take up Arendt’s challenge to confront squarely the institutionalized 
segregation of the international system if we are to ﬁnd a way beyond the 
tragedy of mass statelessness. 
77)  Arendt 2007, p. 273. 
20
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol3/iss2/3
DOI: 101163/187219108X300046
268 P. Hayden / Societies Without Borders 3 (2008) 248–269
 References 
 Agamben, Giorgio 1998, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
 Arendt, Hannah 2007, Th e Jewish Writings, New York: Schocken Books. 
 Arendt, Hannah 2004, Th e Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Schocken Books. 
 Arendt, Hannah 1994, Essays in Understanding 1930–1954, New York: Schocken Books. 
 Arendt, Hannah 1993, Between Past and Future, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
 Arendt, Hannah 1968, Men in Dark Times, San Diego, New York and London: Harcourt 
Brace. 
 Arendt, Hannah 1958, Th e Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 27 June 2007, 
“Temporary Protection Visa Factsheet,” http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/
64protection.htm (14 October 2007). 
 Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2005, “Annual Report, 
2004–05,” http://www.immi.gov.au/about/reports/annual/2004–05/judicial_decisions.
htm (14 October 2007). 
 Balibar, Étienne 2005, “Diﬀerence, Otherness, Exclusion,” Parallax, 11, 1: 19–34. 
 Balibar, Étienne 2004, We, the People of Europe? Reﬂections on Transnational Citizenship, 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
 Batchelor, Carol A. 1995, “UNHCR and Issues Related to Nationality,” Refugee Studies 
Quarterly, 14, 3: 91–112. 
 BBC News, 17 July 2005, “Australia Frees ‘Indian’ Migrant,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
world/south_asia/4690423.stm (15 October 2007). 
 Benhabib, Seyla 2004, Th e Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 Benhabib, Seyla 2002, “Political Geographies in a Global World: Arendtian Reﬂections,” 
Social Research, 69, 2: 539–566. 
 Geddes, Andrew 2000, Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 Gibney, Matthew J. 2006, “‘A Th ousand Little Guantánamos’: Western States and Mea-
sures to Prevent the Arrival of Refugees,” in Kate E. Tunstall (ed.), Displacement, Asy-
lum, Migration: Th e Oxford Amnesty Lectures 2004, pp. 139–169, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 Howard, Jessica 2003, “To Deter and To Deny: Australia and the Interdiction of Asylum 
Seekers,” Refuge, 21, 4: 35–50. 
 Human Rights Watch, July 2007, “Unwelcome Responsibilities: Spain’s Failure to Protect 
the Rights of Unaccompanied Migrant Children in the Canary Islands”, http://hrw.
org/reports/2007/spain0707/spain0707web.pdf (15 October 2007). 
 Human Rights Watch 2006, “Commentary on Australia’s Temporary Protection Visas for 
Refugees,” http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/refugees/australia051303.htm (15 October 
2007). 
 Isaac, Jeﬀrey C. 1998, Democracy in Dark Times, Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press. 
 Kelly, Fran, 30 August 2001, “Tampa Asylum Seekers Caught in Political Deadlock,” Aus-
tralia Broadcasting Corporation, http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2001/s355371.
htm (14 October 2007). 
21
Hayden: From Exclusion to Containment: Arendt, Sovereign Power, and State
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2009
 P. Hayden / Societies Without Borders 3 (2008) 248–269 269
 Marﬂeet, Philip 2006, Refugees in a Global Era, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 Milborn, Corinna, May 2007, “Th e Assault on Fortress Europe: Th ousands are On Th eir 
Way, But Europe Doesn’t Want Th em,” a Goethe-Institut Report, http://www.goethe.
de/ges/pok/prj/mig/en2358674.htm (15 October 2007). 
 Nyers, Peter 2006, Rethinking Refugees: Beyond States of Emergency, New York and London: 
Routledge. 
 Oxfam Australia, February 2002, “Adrift in the Paciﬁc: Th e Implications of Australia’s Paciﬁc 
Refugee Solution,” http://www.oxfam.org.au/campaigns/refugees/still_drifting/still_drifting.
pdf. (16 October 2007). 
 Richmond, Anthony H. 1994, Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism, and the New World 
Order, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
 Schuster, Liza 2005, Th e Realities of a New Asylum Paradigm. Working Paper No. 20, Cen-
tre on Migration Policy and Society, Oxford University, http://www.compas.ox.ac.
uk/publications/papers/Liza%20Schuster%20wp0520.pdf (16 October 2007). 
 Stevens, Jacob 2006, “Prisons of the Stateless,” New Left Review, 42: 53–67. 
 Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth 2004, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World, 2nd edition, New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
 UNHCR, June 2007, Global Trends 2006: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, Internally Dis-
placed and Stateless Persons, http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4676a71d4.
pdf. (2 August 2007). 
 UNHCR, September 2006, “Refugees by Numbers 2006 Edition,” http://www.unhcr.org/
basics/BASICS/4523b0bb2.pdf. (2 August 2007). 
 Weissbrodt, David and Clay Collins 2006, “Th e Human Rights of Stateless Persons,” 
Human Rights Quarterly, 28: 245–276. 
22
Societies Without Borders, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/swb/vol3/iss2/3
DOI: 101163/187219108X300046
23
Hayden: From Exclusion to Containment: Arendt, Sovereign Power, and State
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2009
